Historians of cosmonautics consider Vasily Pavlovich Mishin, the first deputy chief designer of OKB-1, who took Korolev’s chair, to be less strong and purposeful person. They say that if he had been “punchy” like Sergei Pavlovich, if he had a holistic view of space expansion, he would have been able to avoid mistakes and would not have allowed the defeat in the lunar “race”.
But it is hardly necessary to shift the blame onto one man. With the departure of Korolev, the situation remained almost unchanged – the resources allocated to scientific and technical programs of the rocket and space industry remained scarce. Because of this, the “cold war” escalated between the heads of design bureaus, each of which considered their version of cosmonautics more promising. At the same time, the party leadership, insisting on demonstrating the soonest victories in “Khrushchev” style, did not realize the seriousness of the technical problems. All together, this led to a tragic failure.
According to the released project, the Soyuz spacecraft (“7K-OK”) was intended for a one- to three-person crewed mission in Earth orbit. The spacecraft itself was performed in “active” (“A”) and “passive” (“P”) versions, which provided mutual search, rendezvous and docking (mechanical connection) of two manned spacecraft. The second task, which was to be solved, was to test the transition of the crew from one spacecraft to another through open space, the need for which predetermined the technical features of the project of landing on the moon, held under the designation of “H1-L3”.
A distinctive feature of the Soyuz was its layout – it consisted of three compartments: the living compartment (LC), the instrumentation compartment (AC), and the descent vehicle (DA). Why was this done? Let me remind you that the descent vehicles of the Vostoks and Voskhods contained the systems necessary not only for descent, but also for orbital flight during 10-14 days. By relocating these systems to other compartments that did not have heavy heat shielding, the design team was able to noticeably decrease volume and weight of the descent vehicle, and significantly increase total habitability of the spacecraft without an abrupt increase in overall weight. At the same time, spherical “Vostok” descent apparatus on “Soyuz” turned into “lamp”: due to its shape it was possible to control it. In comparison with ballistic descent, which was normal for “Vostok”, it allowed increasing landing accuracy by more than one order (from 300-400 to 5-10 km) and halving or three times (from 8-10 to 3-5 g) reducing g-forces during descent, thus making landing much more comfortable. In 1965, work on “7K-OK” was concentrated in Department No. 93 under the leadership of Ivan Savelyevich Prudnikov. In May, initial data were issued for issuing working documentation on “item 11F615” (ordering control index for Soyuz spacecraft). The spacecraft was created under strict mass limits (no more than 6400-6500 kg in orbit) due to the limited capabilities of the launch vehicle. The size of living compartment and descent unit were selected based on available equipment created for “Vostok”, but taking into account the volume of two living quarters, sufficient for the crew with the minimum of necessary systems – everything else was taken out in a sealed instrument compartment. The propulsion plant with a reserve of fuel was located in an unpressurized aggregate compartment. The radio system Igla was used for pointing and rapprochement of the spacecraft at ranges of 20-30 km.
At the beginning of 1966, selection of cosmonauts for flight tests of the new spacecraft was started. Vasily Pavlovich Mishin, acting at that time as head of OKB-1, made a note in his diary, dated January 22, 1966, about the formation of five crews of 7K-OK: Yuri Alexeyevich Gagarin and Anatoly Fedorovich Voronov, Andriyan Grigoryevich Nikolaev and Yuri Petrovich Artyukhin, Vladimir Mikhailovich Komarov and Pyotr Ivanovich Kolodin, Valery Fedorovich Bykovsky and Alexander Nikolaevich Matinchenko, Evgeny Vasilyevich Khrunov and Dmitry Alexeyevich Zaikin. The leading crews were determined by March: Komarov – Kolodin, Bykovsky – Matinchenko – that is a flying cosmonaut with a non-flying one. It is interesting that, according to Kamanin’s notes, Gagarin was trained at that time in two crews: for a flight to orbit (spacecraft “7K-OK”) and for a flight with landing on the Moon (“L3”).
On April 20, 1966, Minister of General Machine Building Sergey Aleksandrovich Afanasyev held a meeting. Mishin noted in his diary: “Proposals for the 7K-OK were accepted. ‘…’ It was decided to carry out the first flights in stages: ships #1 and #2 – unmanned, with Igla rendezvous and docking system removed, and ships #3 and #4 – manned. The first copies of the Soyuz were completed in the fall. First, two drones were to fly, which would conduct docking in automatic mode, demonstrating the capabilities of the new technology.
November 28, 1966, “active” spacecraft “Soyuz” (“7K-OK(A)” № 2) was launched from the 31st site Tyuratam, known worldwide as the Baikonur Cosmodrome, which was officially called “Cosmos-133”. The next day it was planned to launch “passive” spacecraft “7K-OK(P)” No.1 from the 1st site. But on the first turn of Soyuz, due to an installation error that violated the control logic, it used up all the fuel, and the launch of the second spacecraft was canceled. The testers tried to remove the first malfunctioning spacecraft from orbit, but it followed an uncalculated trajectory and was destroyed by an automatic detonation system. After recommending that the shortcomings be corrected, the State Commission decided to launch Passive Ship No. 1 in a solo flight. The launch was to take place on 14 December 1966. At the moment the launch vehicle was launched, an automatic shutdown of the engines occurred. There was a command to shut down and inspect the rocket. Approximately 27 minutes later, the emergency escape system spontaneously triggered, firing off the descent vehicle, which landed safely 300 meters from the complex. The consequences of this failure were much more serious: the emergency escape system’s engine jets caused a fire on the rocket, which exploded, destroying the 31st floor of the test site to the ground. An officer from the launch party was killed. There could have been many more fatalities, but fortunately the service trusses had not yet been brought down and specialists did not have time to climb them.
Because of the problems with the first spacecraft, the test program was changed. The next Soyuz was urgently converted from manned to unmanned. The launch of 7K-OK(P) No. 3, officially designated Cosmos-140, took place on February 7, 1967, from Site 1. During the two-day flight, the spacecraft systems and engines were tested, and solar-stellar orientation malfunctions were detected, and the Soyuz descent vehicle landed in an uncalculated area – on the ice of the Aral Sea. After a while, the spacecraft sank and had to be retrieved with the help of divers. The examination revealed that the bottom of the descent capsule had melted through in the central part and depressurization occurred during re-entry, which would have been fatal if the aircraft had been manned.
The results of the three unmanned launches showed that the Soyuz spacecraft was still very “raw. It had to be refined and new unmanned launches had to be made. And then the unbelievable happened – the majority of the program leaders were in favor of transitioning to manned flights! Obviously, the political factor played its role: on the eve of the 50th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, the party leadership demanded resumption of cosmonaut flights, because they were not performed for two years, which caused speculations in the Western press and affected the reputation of the USSR as a leading spacefaring nation. Moreover, it was suggested at the meetings that the presence of a pilot in the Soyuz cabin would increase the reliability of the system – in case of emergency, he could act as a “repairman”. The idea was also supported by the members of the cosmonaut squadron, who had an unbearable desire to fly. Lieutenant General Nikolay Petrovich Kamanin made a note in his diary (I quote from Hidden Space: Book Three, 1999):
“February 15 [1967]. I was at Mishin’s place. For more than four hours we dealt with the course of tests of the 7K- OK spacecraft and preparation of the crews for the flight. In answer to my question about the launch dates, Vasily Pavlovich replied: “In our opinion, it is no longer necessary to launch technological spacecraft, we will prepare the flights of Soyuz with cosmonauts on board. Before the flights, it is necessary to finish all the tests and do all the modifications. In short, it will be very good if the first manned flight takes place before April 12”. It was agreed that the flight should take place on March 20-25th. In connection with the fact that 26-51 working days left before departure I asked Mishin to give us all the flight documentation (tasks, programs, instructions) in the next two or three days and to fully finish equipping TBC 60, Tu-104 aircraft and training spacecraft. ‘…’ As sad as it is, I am increasingly disturbed by the thought: we are inevitably approaching new severe accidents. It takes at least 40 days to complete the training of astronauts, with excellent and very hard work the training can be completed in 32-35 days…”
By that time two crews had been finally formed for the first flight on the Soyuz. The main crew: Vladimir Komarov, Valery Bykovsky, Evgeny Khrunov, Alexey Eliseev. Backup crew: Yuri Gagarin, Andriyan Nikolayev, Viktor Gorbatko, Valery Kubasov.
In February-March 1967 two crews underwent intensive training. Vladimir Komarov and Yuri Gagarin mastered the skills of approaching and docking on a special simulator “Volga”, and the crews practiced their actions in transition from ship to ship in a heat bath chamber TBK-60 and on board of the aircraft “Tu-104”, capable to simulate short-term weightlessness. On March 14- 15 the first crew overcame thirty hours of comprehensive training, and on March 17-18 the second crew did the same.
On March 16, in between training sessions, Colonel Engineer Vladimir Mikhailovich Komarov, who was the undisputed leader of the Soyuz program, celebrated his fortieth birthday. Some dissuaded him from this step: there is a popular belief that celebrating forty years is bad luck. On March 25, the Military-Industrial Commission of the Council of Ministers held a meeting to discuss the readiness of the spacecraft and crews. The general conclusion was that the equipment and cosmonauts could be ready for a group flight of the Soyuz with docking between April 20 and 28. No decision was made as to precedence of crews, but everyone silently agreed that Komarov’s crew would be first. After the meeting, a small circle of high-ranking members of the commission remained, and Kamanin was told, under great secrecy, that the government opposed the return of Yuri Gagarin to cosmonautics. Kamanin would later record in his diary (March 27, 1967): “I said that it was too early to turn Gagarin into a museum piece – if we take away from Gagarin the prospect of further flights into space, we will ruin him. Now we keep Gagarin on a regimen (fewer meetings, receptions, and drinks, and more sports, engineering, and flying) and thus keep him healthy and capable of performing. Banning space flights, airplane rides, parachute jumps… so we could go as far as banning him from sports, automobiles, and even walking (people die on the move, too). Having listened to the agitated tirade in defense of Yuri Gagarin’s interests, the members of the commission had to agree with the arguments of the lieutenant-general.
On March 30 both crews passed their theoretical exams with flying colors and on April 8 arrived in Tyuratam. For two weeks the cosmonauts participated in prelaunch training: they settled in the Soyuz, changed individual benches, adjusted helmets, and put on and took off their spacesuits. On April 20th the State Commission met and the crews were approved: the main crew – that of Vladimir Komarov, the back-up crew – that of Yuri Gagarin.
On April 23, 1967, at 3:35 Moscow time, Soyuz-1 manned spaceship (7K-OK(A) number 4) with Vladimir Komarov (call sign “Rubin”) on board was launched. On April 24, Soyuz-2 (7K-OK(P) number 5) was to be launched from the rebuilt pad 31. However, immediately after launching Soyuz-1 into orbit, problems began. The left solar panel did not open. Solar-stellar orientation did not work, so the automatic cranking of the spacecraft failed, which, in turn, led to a discharge of the batteries. Vladimir Komarov tried several times to perform a manual override, but without success. The State Commission, having analyzed the situation, decided to cancel the launch of Soyuz-2 and land Soyuz-1 ahead of schedule. On the sixteenth turn, the cosmonaut received all instructions and began preparing to descent, but the system of ionic orientation did not work, the engine did not start, and the landing failed. Only on the nineteenth turn Komarov managed to bring the ship out of orbit. After separation of the compartments and deceleration of the descent vehicle in the higher layers of the atmosphere, the main parachute container hatch cover blew off, the braking parachute opened, but it could not pull the large dome out of the container. According to operating logic the reserve parachute was activated, but it did not open either, being caught in the aerodynamic “shadow” of the brake parachute. As a result, the descent vehicle crashed at 50 m/s into the ground, crashed and caught fire from hydrogen peroxide from the burst tanks. Vladimir Mikhailovich Komarov, pilot-cosmonaut, died.
The governmental commission which investigated the crash concluded that the main parachute did not come out because it was “clamped” by the walls of the container. The fact that something similar did not happen during testing was explained by “the probability factor”. However, after the completion of the work of the commission another version of what happened appeared: the descent vehicles of spacecrafts #4 and #5, in contrast to the previous unmanned vehicles, were put in the autoclave for polymerization of thermal protection together with the parachute containers, but it turned out that they were not closed with regular covers – as a result of this the walls of containers could be covered with resin deposits, which dramatically increased the friction factor. In order to verify this theory, an experiment was done at the plant: the descent vehicle of the failed Soyuz-2 spacecraft was suspended by the brake parachute and slowly lifted, measuring the force at which the main parachute would come out – what was the surprise of the engineers when they saw that the vehicle, weighing roughly 2.8 tons, was hanging out of the brake parachute like on a rope, while the main parachute did not come out of the container at all. Then it became clear that in April 1967 there could have been an even worse disaster: if the Soyuz-2 had also launched, four cosmonauts would have died.
For Gagarin, the sudden death of his comrade was a terrible moral blow. Worse, Yuri Alekseyevich was well aware that now he was unlikely to be allowed into space. Indeed – the first cosmonaut was excluded from the new crews formed to fly the Soyuz.
Nikolai Petrovich Kamanin advised Gagarin to concentrate on studying at the academy until the general shock passes and passions subside. Yuri did just that.
